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The recent credit crisis has raised a number of interesting questions regarding the role of the Federal Reserve
Bank and the effectiveness of its expected and unexpected interventions in financial markets, especially
during the crisis, given its mandate. This paper reviews and evaluates the impact of expected and unexpected
changes in the federal funds rate target on credit risk premia. The paper's main innovation is the use of an
ACH-VAR (autoregressive conditional hazard VAR) model to generate the Fed's expected and unexpected
monetary policy shocks which are then used to determine the effects of a Federal Reserve policy change on
counterparty credit risk and more importantly short-term firm debt financing. The findings answer a
longstanding question sought by researchers on the effect of policy makers' announcements on firm debt
financing. The results clearly show that the Federal Reserve influences short-term debt financing through
the credit channel for both expansionary and contractionary monetary policies. In particular, we find that
the growth in counterparty risk appears less responsive to anticipated responses in the Fed funds rate that
fail to materialize than to an unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate. Finally, we also document
that the results appear to validate the Feds interventions in financial markets to stem counterparty risk
and to make liquidity more readily available to firms.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper we examine the impact of changes in the federal
funds rate target on firms' short-term credit risk dynamics and the
subsequent implications for short-term debt financing. The extreme
credit climate of 2007/2008 forced financial markets to reassess and
limit counterparty credit risk,2 thereby making it difficult for a num-
ber of highly leveraged firms to raise operational capital (Silipo,
2011). Concerns about credit risk first arose in early 2008 with the
collapse of Bear Stearns and skyrocketed later in that year when
Lehman Brothers defaulted on its debt obligations. In fact, fears of
systemic defaults were so extreme in the aftermath of the Lehman
bankruptcy that Euro-denominated Credit Default Swap (CDS) con-
tracts on the U.S. Treasury were quoted at spreads as high as 100
basis points.
There is a longstanding widespread claim that credit default
swaps3 work to lower the cost of firms' debt financing because they
create a new source of credit risk transfer for corporate bonds.4 Re-
cently, Ashcraft and Santos (2007) challenged this viewpoint arguing
that there is no evidence that the CDS actually lowers the interest
rates on corporate debt. We believe that Ashcraft and Santos' reliance
on time series analysis to evaluate this phenomenon yielded statically
significant but shallow results, so we will use an autoregressive con-
ditional hazard VAR procedure that should provide insights that are
deep, subjective and dynamic. The academic literature suggests that
the credit risk transfer mechanism is itself sensitive to changes in
the short-term rate (Dunbar 2008; Houweling & Vorst, 2005; Jarrow
& Turnbull, 1995) and as such any action by the Federal Reserve
Bank on its lending rate should influence the debt financing and
short-term cash-flow financing needs of firms.
While central banks are generally less concerned with the effects
of financial market bubbles, during the financial market crisis the
Review of Financial Economics 21 (2012) 141–152
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 203 396 8068.
E-mail addresses: dunbark@sacredheart.edu (K. Dunbar),
amina49@sacredheart.edu (A.S. Amin).
1 Tel.: +1 203 416 3463.
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bonds.
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U.S. Federal Reserve Bank aggressively cut its benchmark lending rate
to make capital more easily available to the productive sector and
prevent negative spillovers to the real economy, see Appendix B.
The central bank's unexpected interventions to stem the systematic
effects of the credit shock provide the motivation of this study. Did
the efforts of the Federal Reserve Bank to use the credit channel to
ease liquidity concerns and make capital more readily available to
firms reduce the cost of short-term corporate debt? More specifically
we will attempt to determine (i) the credit risk transfer mechanism's
reaction to an unanticipated monetary policy shock given an extreme
macroeconomic event that pushes credit risk temporarily away from
its long run equilibrium growth path, (ii) the effect of this unexpected
Federal Reserve monetary policy change on firms of different credit
qualities and ultimately (iii) the implications for short-term debt
financing.
Despite the apparent significance of credit risk in financial mar-
kets, there has been relatively little empirical research about how it
affects the price of short-term debt financing in which counterparties
may default. Appendix A illustrates the credit risk spreads of invest-
ment grade debt, high yield debt and their reaction to both expected
and unexpected Fed policy responses. The chart plots the time series
of the “on-the-run” spreads of the CDX.NA.IG (Investment grade) and
the CDX.NA.HY (High yield) indexes. The behavior of the index
spreads over the sample period can be divided into two phases. In
the phase prior to the credit crisis, the spreads were relatively low
in magnitude, while in the second phase starting about June 2007
the spreads became highly volatile. The indexes however retreat
before the September 18th 2007 FOMC meeting. On December 31st
2007 both indexes jumped sharply, only to retreat again before the
March 18th 2008 meeting.
To better understand the short-term dynamics of changes in
the federal funds rate on CDS and the effect of the changes in the
CDS on the short-term debt financing of the firm we turn to papers
by Hamilton and Jorda (2002) and Tsai (2011) for empirical motiva-
tion. Both papers formulate a measure of monetary policy shocks
based on the ACH/VAR (autoregressive conditional hazard VAR)
methodology for the federal funds rate target. A key feature in these
models is that they allow for the analysis of two sources of unexpected
changes in the federal funds target.Where, the unexpected increase can
be due to either an increase in the federal funds rate target when it was
expected to remain constant, or an expected increase in the federal
funds rate target that fails to occur. These two events in the ACH-VAR
model give rise to completely different information on the expected
future federal funds rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a review of the existing literature Section 3 describes the
econometric model which is based on the Hamilton and Jorda's ACH
and ordered-probit models that is used to model the federal funds
rate target, and the ACH-VAR. Section 4 describes the data for ACH,
the ordered-probit model, and the ACH-VAR model respectively, while
Section 5 contains our empirical results for the ACH and ordered-probit
models. Section 5 also discusses the effect of an unanticipated increase
in the federal funds rate target on stock returns in the ACH-VAR model.
We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Review of the literature
There is a large and growing literature on the valuation of the
credit risk transfer mechanism (CDS),5 within which two distinct ap-
proaches dominate. One approach (Merton, 1974) explicitly relates a
credit event to the value of the firm's assets. The firm is assumed to
default on its obligations when the firm value falls below some
threshold (Das, 1995; Pierides, 1997). These types of models are
called structural models because the link to some underlying eco-
nomic fundamentals is explicit. The second approach, which finds
its origins in the modeling of the risk-free term structure is referred
to as the reduced form approach because the relationship with
underlying variables such as the firm value is not explicitly modeled
(Dunbar, 2008; Duffie & Singleton, 1999; Houweling & Vorst, 2005;
Hull & White, 2000; Jarrow, Lando, & Turnbull, 1997; Jarrow &
Turnbull, 1995). Regardless of the approach used, the short-term
rate is used to reflect the Federal Reserves' policy response, which is
also a predictor of credit risk. In fact, a number of prior studies have
indicated that an increase in the short-term risk-free rate could mean
a contractionary monetary policy, which usually increases credit risk,
while an expansionary monetary policy reduces credit risk.
Since capital markets are imperfect, information asymmetries are
expected to lead to a wedge between the cost of internal and external
funds. Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stigitz and Weiss (1981) both
find agency problems in an imperfect capital market makes external
financing costly. Many in the academic and practitioner literature
claim that credit default swaps lower the cost of borrowing because
they provide new hedging opportunities and information on firms.
Almeida and Campello (2007) and Hahn and Lee (2009) both provide
evidence that a firm's ability to obtain external financing significantly
affects corporate investment and ultimately firm value.
To isolate and estimate investor reactions to monetary policy
changes, a preponderance of papers has employed the Vector Auto
Regression (VAR) technique (Cook & Hahn, 1989). Thorbecke (1997)
measures the effects of monetary policy changes in the federal funds
rate on asset prices, and finds that an expansionary monetary policy
has had a significant positive effect on asset returns. Ewing, Forbes,
and Payne (2003) employ VAR to identify the different responses
of five sector-specific S&P 500 stock returns to monetary shocks.
Cassola and Morana (2004) use a cointegrated VAR to investigate
the effects of monetary policy on the Euro stock market, and also
find that a contractionary monetary shock has a positive effect on
stock prices. In all these cases, the general consensus was that mone-
tary policy shocks significantly influence the movements of asset
prices.
However, a shortcoming with most of these earlier studies is the
inability to decompose the Federal Reserve's policy change into
components that could be used to isolate the effects of the Fed's
actions. This is because ample evidence exists to suggest that financial
markets do not respond to anticipated monetary policy changes
(Andersen, Bollersev, Diebold, & Vega, 2007; Bernanke & Kuttner,
2005; Chulia, Martens, & Dijk, 2010; Guo, 2004; Gurkaynak, Sack, &
Swanson, 2005; Wongswan, 2009). In fact, Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005) addressed this issue with the use of an innovative policy
decomposition procedure introduced in Kuttner (2001), which iso-
lates the unexpected (surprise) policy change which might plausibly
generate market (credit risk) responses. This does not mean that
credit risk respond to monetary policy only when the Fed surprises
the markets. Naturally, credit risk will also respond to expectations
about future policy, which in turn may be driven by news about
changing economic conditions.
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) argued that estimating the response
of financial markets to monetary policy actions is complicated by the
fact that the market is unlikely to respond to policy actions that were
already anticipated. Kuttner's (2001) event study methodology de-
composes the surprise and expected change in the federal funds tar-
get rate and the corresponding Fed funds futures rate on the day of
the FOMC announcements. Kuttner (2001) then used the surprise
and anticipated decomposition to estimate the impact of the mone-
tary policy event on asset prices. However a weakness in the event
study methodology is the fact that it can only estimate the immediate
effect of an unanticipated monetary policy on markets. Hence it is not
5 A credit default swap is a contingent claim that allows the trading of default risk
separately from other sources of uncertainty. This instrument is essentially an insur-
ance contract against the default of an underlying entity.
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able to estimate the dynamic response of the markets to an unantici-
pated monetary policy stimulus. Thus, this limitation of the event
study methodology motivates us to investigate the dynamic effects
of credit risk premia based on the unanticipated shock of the target
change.
The traditional linear VAR measures of monetary policy fail to
allow us to separately estimate the dynamic effects of unanticipated
monetary shocks from anticipated shocks, since the usual VAR
impulse–response analysis is estimated only by a monetary policy
shock measured as the difference between the federal funds rate
and the rate that one would have predicted. Such a monetary shock
makes no distinction between a forecast error that arises because of an
anticipated change in the target or a surprise change in the target. This
weakness led Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) to adopt the Campbell–
Ammer framework by relating the proxies for expectations to the
surprise news regarding the path of monetary policy embodied in the
surprises derived from Federal funds futures (proposed by Campbell,
1991; Campbell & Ammer, 1993), where the federal funds surprise was
introduced in the VAR model as an exogenous variable. This approach
effectively break the VAR's one-month-ahead forecast error into a com-
ponent having to do with the surprise news regarding monetary policy,
and the component incorporating a rational forecast made at time t.
Work by Hamilton and Jorda (2002) further decomposed the un-
anticipated policy change into one where there was an unexpected
increase (decrease) in the funds rate target and another where
there was an expectation of an increase (decrease) which failed to
materialize. This characteristic is of particular importance to counter-
party risk analysis. As we discussed earlier, central banks manage
monetary policy so as to foster economic growth. They are less con-
cerned with avoiding asset price bubbles. However the central bank
may or may not react after such bubbles deflate, so as to minimize
possible damages to the real economy. This is where both types of
an unexpected change in the ACH framework become meaningful.
Hence to better understand the short term dynamics of CDS on short
term debt financing and firm valuewe turn to this autoregressive con-
ditional hazard VAR (ACH-VAR) approach first proposed by Hamilton
and Jorda to estimate monetary policy surprises; this model explicitly
considers the discrete nature of the federal funds rate target, and is
able to capture the serial dependence in such a series. The ACH-VAR
approach decomposes the unexpected federal funds rate target
changes into a forecast error that arises because the Fed unexpectedly
raised the target and one in which a drop in the target was anticipated
but failed tomaterialize. These two events in the ACH-VAR framework
has been shown by Hamilton and Jorda (2002) and Tsai (2011) to
contain completely different statistical information on the expected
future federal funds rate, and therefore should have quite different
responses from credit risk and subsequently short-term firm debt
and firm value.
3. Methodology
3.1. The autoregressive conditional hazard model
The paper develops an autoregressive conditional hazard (ACH)
and ordered probit framework as described in Hamilton and Jorda
(2002) to predict the probability and magnitude of a change in the
federal funds rate conditional on historical information. The ACH re-
sults are subsequently used jointly with the VAR model to determine
impulse response dynamics. This ACH model which uses calendar
time is a variant of Engle and Russell's (1998) autoregressive condi-
tional duration (ACD) model which uses an event index to model the
average length of time until the next change in the funds rate occur.
This modification allows the new information since the previous tar-
get change to be most relevant in predicting the next target change.
The ACH framework is particularly useful to model processes that
change in discrete intervals. In our case, a given change in federal
funds rate typically occurs in discrete time interval. Let φN(t) be the
expectation of the length of time denoted as uN(t) between the nth
and the (n+1)th time the Fed changed the target rate conditional
on uN(t−1), uN(t−2). Formally the ACH model can thus be represented
as:
φN tð Þ ¼∑mj¼1αjuN tð Þ−j þ∑rj¼1βj φN tð Þ−j ð1Þ
where the φN(t) or average length of time is clearly a function of time
and expression (1) will change only when there is a change in the
target rate. Now if we define ht as the conditional probability of a
change in the target based on the information set available at time
t−1 defined asℵt−1. Then the expected length of time until the
next change in the target will be:
1
ht
¼∑∞j¼1j 1−htð Þ j−1ht ð2Þ
where the hazard rate implied by the ACHmodel in Eq. (1) would be
then:
ht ¼
1
φN t−1ð Þ
: ð3Þ
Now if we denote zt−1 as a vector of exogenous variables known at
time t−1, Eq. (3) can be generalized as:
ht ¼
1
φN t−1ð Þ þ δZ′t−1
: ð4Þ
The above generalized hazard function requires that ht do not take
values outside (0, 1) or φ>1 to ensure convergence in the numerical
search. One way to satisfy this condition will be to use a smooth tran-
sition function, that is γ[τ], hence Eq. (4) is updated as:
ht ¼
1
γ φN t−1ð Þ þ δZ′t−1
h i : ð5Þ
This hazard rate can then be used to estimate the log likelihood
function. If we assume xt=1 for a change in target rate during the
week t and zero otherwise, then the probability of observing xt
given ℵt−1 is:
g xt jℵt−1; θ1ð Þ ¼ htð Þxt 1−htð Þ1−xt ð6Þ
where the conditional log-likelihood function given the parameter
vector θ1 ¼ δ′;α′;β′
 
is:
L1 θ1ð Þ ¼∑Tt¼1 xt log htð Þ þ 1−xtð Þ log 1−xtð Þ½ : ð7Þ
Here the MLE estimates obtained by maximizing Eq. (7) require
the additional constraints αj≥0,βj≥0 and 0≤β1+β2+…+βr≤1.
3.2. The ordered probit model
An ordered probit model is used to analyze how much the target
will change if the Fed decides to change the target. If yt is the size of
the change in fed rate, then there exists a latent variable yt* such that
yt ¼ wt−1 π
′ þt : ð8Þ
Wherewt−1 is a vector of exogenous variables observed at t−1with
residuals that are i.i.d. N (0, 1). Now assume the fed changes its target
rate by discrete intervals of s1,s2,s3……sk (where s1bs2bs3b……bsk).
Conditional on a change in the funds rate, it is hypothesized that the
143K. Dunbar, A.S. Amin / Review of Financial Economics 21 (2012) 141–152
Author's personal copy
observed discrete target change, yt, is related to latent continuous vari-
able yt* in the following way:
yt ¼
s1 if y

t∈ −∞; c1ð 
s2 if y

t∈ c1; c2ð 
⋅
⋅
⋅
sk if y

t∈ ck−1;∞ð Þ
8>>><
>>>:
ð9Þ
where c1bc2bc3………bck and where the probability that the target
will change by sj is given by
Pr yt ¼ sjjwt−1;xt ¼ 1
 
¼ Pr ct−1bw′t−1πþ εt ≤ ct
 
ð10Þ
given j=1,2, …, k, with c0=−∞ and ct=∞. The cumulative density
function is
Pr yt ¼ sjjwt−1;xt ¼ 1
 
¼
Φ c1−w′t−1π
 
for j ¼ 1
Φ cj−w′t−1π
 
−Φ cj−1−w′t−1π
 
for j ¼ 2;3;……:k−1
1−Φ ck−1−w′t−1π
 
for j ¼ k
8>><
>>:
ð11Þ
whereΦ(z) is the CDF of a standard normal distribution. Let l(yt|wt-1,θ2)
be the log of probability of observing yt conditional onwt−1 and xt=1,
then,
l yt jwt−1; θ2ð Þ
¼
log Φ c1−w′t−1π
 h i
log Φ cj−w′t−1π
 
−Φ cj−1−w′t−1π
 h i
log 1−Φ ck−1−w′t−1π
 h i
if yt ¼ s1
if yt ¼ s2; s3……sk−1
if yt ¼ sk
8>><
>>:
ð12Þ
where the parameter vector θ2 ¼ π ́; c1; c2;…′ …:ck−1
 
and the condi-
tional likelihood function is:
L2 θ2ð Þ ¼∑Tt¼1xtl yt wt−1; θ2j Þ:ð ð13Þ
The MLE estimates from Eq. (13) is obtained under the condition
that cj>cj−1 for j=1, 2, …, k−1.
3.3. The ACH-VAR model
The Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) model is used to evaluate
the impact of a change in federal funds rate on counterparty credit
risk. This paper follows Thorbecke's (1997) methodology with a mod-
ification, allowing for two different surprises in the federal funds rate
target. Assume Yt a vector of the data in month t consists of the
growth rate of employment (EM), the inflation rate (P), market
liquidity (LIQ), the federal funds rate (f), the log of broad money
(M2), the log of investment grade credit risk (CDXi) and high yield
grade counterparty credit risk (CDXh).We also denote Y1,t=(EMt,Pt,LIQt)
as those variables that come before the federal funds rate ft and Y2,t=
(M2t,CDXit,CDXht) are variables that come after. In VAR, we estimate
the effect of monetary policy shock based on a Cholesky decomposition
of the residual variance–covariance matrix:
∂E Ytþsj f t ;Y1;t ;Yt−1;Yt−2;…:
 
∂ft
: ð14Þ
Eq. (14) also measures the effect of an orthogonalized shock of
ft on Yt+1, where the orthogonalized shock is defined as utf=ft−
E(ft|Y(1,t),Y(t−1),Y(t−2),….).. Equivalently we can also write:
uft ¼ f t−f t−1− E f t Y1;t ;Yt−1; Yt−2;…:
 −f t−1 i:h ð15Þ
A positive value of utf can come from two sources: i) the Fed could
have change the target (ft−ft−1>0) when no change was expected
[E(ft|Y1,t,Yt−1,Yt−2,….)−ft−1=0]; ii) the Fed may not have changed
the target (ft−ft−1=0) even though a drop of [E(ft|Y1,t,Yt−1,Yt−2,….)−
ft−1b0] was expected. In the usual linear VAR setup these two events
would likely produce the same result. But in the case of the ACH,
these two events are not forced to have the same effects.6 Here we
find that a major innovation of this methodology is the separation of
different effects of the federal funds rate on counterparty credit risk.
A perennial issue with the VAR impulse framework discussed in
Tsai (2011) surrounds the ordering of the variables. To address the
“ordering” issue related with estimation of the impulse response
function, we turn to existing literature mainly Bernanke and Blinder
(1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), Thorbecke (1997),
and Croushore and Evans (2006). The ordering of variables in our VAR
specification is the growth rate of employment (EM), the inflation rate
(P), market liquidity (LIQ), the federal funds rate (f), the log of broad
money (M2) and specific to this study, the log of investment grade
credit risk (CDXi) and high yield grade counterparty credit risk
(CDXh).7 Consistent with the earlier literature, it is assumed that
Fed responds to the growth of employment, the inflation rate, and
the liquidity conditions in financial markets.
4. Data source
4.1. Data for ACH and ordered probit-models
Our paper investigates how both anticipated and unanticipated
changes in the Fed target affected credit risk premia and debt financ-
ing. The study uses data covering the periodMarch 2003 to September
2008. A complete set of CDX data is available only from March 2003
which sets up the beginning of the sample period. In addition, due to
the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the Federal Open Market Committee
(Henceforth FOMC) on October 8th 2008 decided to institute a target
range for the federal funds rate of 50 to 150 basis points. Such a low
target range is not appropriate for the estimation of the ACH model
that's why we limit our estimation to September 2008. The raw data
in our study also includes the dates and sizes of the federal funds tar-
get changes for 2003–2008 as reported by the Federal Reserve Banks
of New York and St. Louis.
Appendix B includes the dates and size of federal funds target
changes and Appendix C reports meeting dates of FOMC. The FOMC
directives almost always implement the target change immediately,
and target changes typically occur in discrete increments of 25 basis
points, with the exception of 2008 when the Feds took the unusual
step to make a few isolated 50 and 75 basis points cuts.
To be able to predict the timing of changes in the target (vector zt−1
in Eq. (4)) we follow the earlier work by Hamilton and Jorda. Despite
the extensive literature relating Fed policy to a number of macro-
economic variables, Hamilton and Jorda found that for the specific
task of predictingwhether the Fed is going to change the target during
any given week, institutional factors and simple time series appear to
be far more useful. Hence, the variables considered to be included in
the vector zt−1 in Eq. (4) for predicting the timing of changes in the
target can be divided into 3 categories: (i) macroeconomic variables
6 A detailed description on ACH-VAR model can be obtained from Hamilton and
Jorda (2002).
7 Data on credit risk premia is obtained from Markit Financial Information Services.
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that may influence the Fed's policy objectives within the context of
the Taylor rule; (ii) monetary and financial aggregate variables, for
example the absolute value of the spread between the effective federal
funds rate and the six-month Treasury bill rate (|SP6t|); (iii) and vari-
ables consisting of the dates of the FOMCmeetings, the size of the pre-
vious target change and the number of weeks since the previous
change. See Appendix D for a list of the data variables and sources.
4.2. Data for the ACH-VAR model
One of the main inputs of our VAR specification is the credit risk
premia. The CDX North American Investment Grade index (CDX.NA.IG)
is a US Benchmark for tradable 5year and 10year index products. The
index consists of 125 North American investment-grade companies
andwas first issued in 2003. On the other hand, the CDXNorth American
High Yield Index (CDX.NA.HY) is comprised of 100North AmericanHigh
Yield grade companies. Data on the CDX was obtained from Markit
Financial Information Services. Data on market liquidity, Inflation,
Employment, M2, the Fed funds target, the Effective Funds rate, the
6month Treasury bill rate (TB6) was obtained from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis.
5. Empirical results of the ACH, ordered-probit and
ACH-VAR models
5.1. Empirical results for the ACH model
Table 1 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for the model
covering the sample period March 2003 to September 2008 for the
ACH (0, 1) model. We achieve convergence by setting the coefficient
on φN(t−1) to zero and adding the FOMCt and |SP6t−1|.
The results in Table 1 indicate that both FOMCt and |SP6t−1| are
significant in predicting the next target change. Since 1994, the Fed
has tended to implement target changes during the week of the
FOMC meeting rather than the week after, and consistent with Tsai
(2011) we find FOMCt is significant in predicting the likelihood of
the next target change during the period 2003–2008. The average
absolute spread SP6t−1 is another important variable that influences
the change of target. If the six-month Treasury bill rate is far away
from the federal funds rate, then we can expect the Fed to change
the target. The average absolute spread over this period is 0.311,
and the mean duration ū is 14.47. To understand the effect of the
FOMC meeting we first estimate the hazard rate of a target change
for our sample period:
1
61:268þ 0:077 14:47þ 3:204 0:311 ¼
1
63:379
¼ 0:0158:
There is only a 1.58% chance that Fed will change the target next
week if no FOMCmeeting is scheduled. In contrast, due to a statistically
significant and large negative coefficient on FOMCt the probability of a
target change increases to
1
63:379−61:921 ¼ 0:686
That is, if there is an FOMCmeeting inweek t, a change in the target
is more likely to happen.
5.2. Empirical results for the ordered-probit model
The empirical estimates of the ordered probit model are presented
in Table 2.8 The ordered probit model estimates the size of federal
target changes when they occur.
From Appendix B, we can see that since January 1991 the changes
in targets have been in increments of 25.0 basis points. We follow
Hamilton and Jorda's (2002) empirical estimates of the ordered-
probit model for the sizes of Fed target changes when they occur.
We consolidate the data into 5 possible categories for changes in
the target (along with the three changes of 75 basis points in 2008)
as follows. With yt* denoting the actual change in the target value
according to Appendix B, the data used in the analysis is defined as
yt
9
yt ¼
−0:5 if−∞≤yt≤−0:4375
−0:25 if−0:4375≤yt≤−0:125
0:00 if−0:125≤yt ≤0:125
0:25 if 0:125≤yt≤0:4375
0:50 if 0:4375≤yt≤∞:
8>><
>>:
Table 2 reports the empirical estimates of threshold parameters
and exogenous variables. The coefficients of lagged target change
(yt,N(t−1)) and the difference between the 6-month Treasure bill and
Table 1
Parameter estimates for the ACH (0, 1) model for 2003–2008. ACH (0, 1) model
φN tð Þ ¼ α uN tð Þ−1
ht ¼
1
γ φN t−1ð Þ þ δ1constant þ δ2FOMCt þ δ3 SP6t−1j j
h i :
Parameters Variables Estimates Standard error
α uN(t)−1 0.77** 0.047
δ1 Constant 61.268** 31.839
δ2 FOMCt −61.921** 31.848
δ3 SP6t−1 3.204** 2.015
Log likelihood −49.203
The variable FOMCt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if in week ‘t’ there
is an FOMC meeting and zero otherwise. SP6t−1 is the absolute value of the spread
between the 6‐month Treasury bill rate (TB6) and the federal funds rate. The federal
funds rate used is an average of the daily effective federal funds rate for the week
ending on Wednesday. The TB6 is an average of the 6-month Treasury rate on the sec-
ondary market for the week ending Wednesday. To ensure the convergence the model
uses a smooth transition function γ[τ]. In addition, φN(t) denotes the expectation of the
length of time denoted as uN(t) between the nth and the (n+1)th time the Fed changed
the target rate and ht represents the conditional probability of a change in the target.
Table 2
Parameter estimates for the ordered probit model for 2003–2008. ACH-ordered probit
model
Pr yt ¼ sj wt−1; xt ¼ 1j Þ ¼ Pr ct−1b π1yt;N tð Þ−1 þ π2SP6t−1 þ εt≤ct
 
:

Parameters Variables Estimates Standard error
π1 yt,N(t)−1 5.912*** 1.085
π2 SP6t−1 2.376*** 0.583
c1 −2.979*** 0.55
c2 −2.003*** 0.389
c3 1.263*** 0.24
c4 3.559*** 0.552
–Log likelihood −34.163
yt,N(t)−1which represents the magnitude of the last federal funds target change as of
the date t−1. SP6t−1 is the value of the spread between the 6-month Treasury bill
rate and the federal Funds rate. The federal funds rate used is an average of the daily
effective federal funds rate for the week ending on Wednesday. ***, **, and * are the
levels of significance of the coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.
8 Several of the ACH explanatory variables were found to be insignificant in explaining
the magnitude of the target change and were therefore dropped from the analysis.
9 Where −0.4375, −0.125, 0.125 and 0.4375 are all multiples of 25 basis points.
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federal funds target rate (SP6t−1) are statistically significant in explaining
the sizes of the target changes. A significantly positive coefficient on yt,
N(t−1) implies if the previous change raised the target rate then there is
a higher probability that Fed will increase the funds rate this week.
Further, a positive and significant coefficient on SP6t−1 implies that if
the six-month Treasury bill rate is above the federal funds rate, then
we can expect the Fed to raise the target and vice-versa. In addition,
the estimated cutoff points are also found to be statistically significant.
5.3. Discussion of the ACH-VAR empirical results
We estimated both (a) linear and (b) ACH-VAR models which
include our macro variables plus the variables measuring credit risk
growth for each debt category discussed earlier. Figs. 1 and 2 present
the results of the impulse–response functions for the growth of em-
ployment, the inflation rate, liquidity, the federal funds rate, broad
money (M2) and credit risk premia. Fig. 1 (Fig. 2) presents the results
of a positive (negative) policy shock to the federal funds rate target
and the corresponding responses of the macro variables and credit
risk premia.
As discussed in Section 3, the ACH-VAR model decomposes the
effects of an unanticipated monetary policy shock on credit risk
into two components. The dashed line in Fig. 1 (Fig. 2) records
the average values over all the dates (τ) in our sample and an-
swers the question as to what happens when the Federal Reserve
deliberately and unexpectedly increases (decreases) its target for
the federal funds rate (see Eq. (E.1) in Appendix E). The dotted
line in Fig. 1 (Fig. 2) answers the question as to what happens if
investors predict that the Fed will decrease (increase) its target
for the federal funds rate, but in fact the target remains unchanged.
The results are completely different and suggest that the Fed's deci-
sion not to increase (lower) the target typically has few lasting
consequences.
In Fig. 1, the dashed line suggests that when the Federal Reserve
deliberately but unexpectedly raises its target for the effective fed-
eral funds rate, the effect of this surprise monetary policy shock re-
sults in an initial decline in the growth of the credit risk premia for
both the investment grade (−0.4%) and high yield debt (−0.8%).
Consistent with the established literature, the results also show
that the growth in money supply decreases by 0.2% and liquidity
growth picks up over the first month as money supply growth
picks up with the decay of the initial policy shock. In fact, as the
shock to the federal funds rate target decays and normalizes after
the first month, the growth in credit risk premia of high risk debt
which overshoots in the first month declines, while stabilizing for
investment grade debt over the next 8months. As our results indi-
cate, if the Fed unexpectedly raises the target, it may cause the av-
erage investor to revise his/her forecast to reveal a possible
substantial increase in the federal funds rate in the future. Conse-
quently, this unexpected funds rate increase leads to an initial
Fig. 1. The effect of yt+j for j=0,1,2,…,11 of different definitions of an innovation in the Fed funds rate. Impulse responses of a 100-basis-point increase in fτ on the CDX.NA.IG and the
CDX.NA.HY credit risk premium growth under different definitions of an innovation. The unit for each variable on the vertical axis is percent. The horizontal axis is the lag horizon in
months. Solid line: innovation refers to a forecast error in the VAR (Traditional VAR). Dashed line: innovation means that the Fed deliberately raised the federal funds target. Dotted
line: innovation refers to the case where the Fed was expected to lower the target fed funds rate but this never materialized.
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decline in credit risk premia because of a rise in the future
expected interest rates used to discount firm value.
The dotted line in Fig. 1 denotes the response of investors
predicting a decline in the federal funds rate target that fails to
materialize. These results are different from those earlier findings
in which the Federal Reserve deliberately but unexpectedly
changes its target for the federal funds rate. This shock leads to
less volatility in the growth of employment, inflation, the federal
funds rate and market liquidity. It indicates, as is well known, the
Fed's deliberate decision not to change the target has few lasting
effects on these macroeconomic variables compared to the Federal
Reserve deliberate decision to change its target. In addition, the
dotted line in the second panel on the right of Fig. 1 shows that
this negative monetary policy shock causes the federal funds rate
to decline initially (−1.5% for investment grade and −0.9% for
high yield bonds) but normalizing around the target rate by the
second month.
In the case of the traditional linear VAR impulse–response func-
tion (solid line), which describes the effects of a 100-basis-point in-
crease in fT (the effective federal funds rate) on each of the other
variables, the second-left graph of Fig. 1 shows that a monetary policy
shock initially has no effect on market liquidity which subsequently
rises 0.1% as the initial impulse declines, reaching a maximum after
the fifth month. Similarly to the findings of Hamilton and Jorda
(2002) the growth in M2 initially declines (−0.2%) but recovers
and overshoots (0.4%) within the next 4months.
In Fig. 2 we examine the effects of an unexpected 100 basis point
cut in the federal funds rate target on the credit risk transfer mecha-
nism. The results indicate thatwhen the Federal Reserve unexpectedly
cuts its target for the effective federal funds rate, the effect of this sur-
prise monetary policy shock (the dashed line) is an initial jump in the
growth of the credit risk premia for both investment grade (0.4%) and
high yield (1.0%) debt. Interestingly, the growth of high yield credit
risk premia declines sharply during the first month (−0.6%) and
stays relatively low over the next 5months. Similarly, the growth in
investment grade debt falls by 1.2% during the first month, after
which it gradually rises to 0.4% in the 8th month. The results also
show that the growth in money supply jumps by 0.4% and liquidity
growth picking up by the second month as the federal funds rate
stabilizes.
These results suggest that the Fed's unexpected monetary policy
expansion is initially helpful to both types of debt in particular the
highly risky debt. In fact, the results also indicate that if the Fed unex-
pectedly lowers the target rate, this may lead the average investor
to revise his forecast to reveal a substantial decrease in the future fed-
eral funds rate, leading to a decline in the future expected interest
Fig. 2. The effect of yt+j for j=0,1,2,…,11 of different definitions of an innovation in the Fed funds rate. Impulse responses of a 100-basis-point decrease in fτ on the CDX.NA.IG and
the CDX.NA.HY credit risk premium growth under different definitions of an innovation. The unit for each variable on the vertical axis is percent. The horizontal axis is the lag
horizon in months. Solid line: innovation refers to a forecast error in the VAR (Traditional VAR). Dashed line: innovation means that the Fed decreased the federal funds target.
Dotted line: innovation refers to the case where the Fed was expected to increase the target fed funds rate but this never materialized.
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rates used to discount firm value, which may be one reason why an
unexpected negative shock leads to an initial increase in credit risk
premia. On the other hand, the dotted line suggests that if it is
expected that the Fed will lower the target but it does not, this new
information might cause the future federal funds rate to initially dis-
count firm debt at the same rate as the prior innovation, but typically
having few lasting consequences on short-term firm debt while con-
tinuing to discount investment grade debt far less than high yield
debt.
In summary our results presented in Figs. 1 and 2 indicate that pol-
icy responses lead to market responses which may have significant
implications for short-term debt financing. In fact an unexpected in-
creases the target rate results in a surprise monetary shock leading
to an initial decline in the credit risk premia on bonds, which is
more profound on high risk bonds. Conversely, a decline in the federal
funds rate target results in an initial increase in credit risk which
declines over the first month and appears less volatile for high risk
relative to investment grade debt over the next 5months.
In addition, it is well known that if the firm's credit riskiness
suddenly increases (as seen in the jump in the growth in CDS prices),
then its cost of capital and its required rate of return will also in-
crease. A further important implication of these results is the short
term response by firms to the unexpected change in the Fed's policy
which suggests that a change in policy has positive short-term effects
on corporate debt contrary to the findings in Ashcraft and Santos
(2007).
6. Conclusion
This paper investigates how an unexpected policy shock in the
federal funds rate target influences the growth in credit risk and
evaluates the implications for short-term debt financing in which
counterparties may default. We use an ACH-VAR model that allows
us to distinguish between two types of innovations; (i) the effects of
an unanticipated monetary policy shock arising from a surprise
change in the funds rate target, and (ii) an expected target change
in the federal funds rate that failed to materialize.
The findings answer a longstanding question sought by re-
searchers on the effect of policy makers' announcements on firm
debt. The results from the ACH-VARmodel indicate that an unexpect-
ed policy shock leads to short-term market responses that appear
positive for firm debt financing, particularly for firms of poor credit
quality, which is initially very responsive. We also find that the
growth in counterparty risk appears less responsive to anticipated
responses in the Fed funds rate that fail to materialize than an unan-
ticipated increase in the federal funds rate. For instance, during con-
tractionary periods counterparty risk responds more favorably when
the Federal Reserve unexpectedly lowers its target than when they
do nothing when investors were expecting some action on the Fed
funds rate.
Interestingly, we find that both sets of innovations generated
by the ACH-VAR model contain completely different information
on the expected future federal funds rate, and thus have quite dif-
ferent impacts on credit risk. The results clearly show the Federal
Reserve's influence of firm debt financing through the credit chan-
nel for both an expansionary and contractionary monetary poli-
cies. It also demonstrates that the Central bank has managed to
stem the systematic counterparty credit risk fears in financial mar-
kets through this channel. Finally, the results appear to validate
the Feds unexpected intervention in financial markets to help
make liquidity more readily available to firms through the credit
channel.
Appendix A
Appendix A. Graphical illustration of CDS response to Fed policy from 2003–2008. Appendix A presents the credit risk spreads of investment grade debt, high yield debt and their
reaction to possible Fed policy responses. The chart plots the time series of the “on-the-run” spreads of the CDX.NA.IG (investment grade) and the CDX.NA.HY (high yield) indexes.
The behavior of the index spreads over the sample period can be divided into two phases. In the phase prior to the credit crisis, the spreads were relatively low in magnitude, while
in the second phase starting about June 2007 the spreads become highly volatile. The indexes however retreat ahead of the September 18th 2007 FOMC meeting. On December 31st
2007 both indexes jumped sharply, only to retreat ahead of the March 18th 2008 meeting. Source: JPMorgan.
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Appendix B. Sizes of FOMC federal funds target changes 1984–2008
Date of change Target value Target change Duration in days Day of the week
1-Mar-84 9.5 na Thursday
15-Mar-84 9.875 0.375 14 Thursday
22-Mar-84 10 0.125 7 Thursday
29-Mar-84 10.25 0.25 7 Thursday
5-Apr-84 10.5 0.25 7 Thursday
14-Jan-84 10.625 0.125 70 Thursday
21-Jun-84 11 0.375 7 Thursday
19-Jul-84 11.25 0.25 28 Thursday
9-Aug-84 11.5625 0.3125 21 Thursday
30-Aug-84 11.4375 −0.125 21 Thursday
20-Sep-84 11.25 −0.1875 21 Thursday
27-Sep-84 11 −0.25 7 Thursday
4-Oct-84 10.5625 −0.4375 7 Thursday
11-Oct-84 10.5 −0.0625 7 Thursday
18-Oct-84 10 −0.5 7 Thursday
8-Nov-84 9.5 −0.5 21 Thursday
23-Nov-84 9 −0.5 15 Friday
6-Dec-84 8.75 −0.25 13 Thursday
20-Dec-84 8.5 −0.25 14 Thursday
27-Dec-84 8.125 −0.375 7 Thursday
24-Jan-85 8.25 0.125 28 Thursday
14-Feb-85 8.375 0.125 21 Thursday
21-Feb-85 8.5 0.125 7 Thursday
21-Mar-85 8.625 0.125 28 Thursday
28-Mar-85 8.5 −0.125 7 Thursday
18-Apr-85 8.375 −0.125 21 Thursday
25-Apr-85 8.25 −0.125 7 Thursday
16-May-85 8.125 −0.125 21 Thursday
20-May-85 7.75 −0.375 4 Monday
11-Jul-85 7.6875 1.0625 52 Thursday
25-Jul-85 7.75 0.625 14 Thursday
22-Aug-85 7.8125 0.625 28 Thursday
29-Aug-85 7.875 0.625 7 Thursday
6-Sep-85 8 0.125 8 Friday
18-Dec-85 7.75 −0.25 103 Wednesday
1-Mar-86 7.25 −0.5 79 Friday
10-Apr-86 7.125 1.125 34 Thursday
17-Apr-86 7 −0.125 7 Thursday
24-Apr-86 6.75 −0.25 7 Thursday
11-Jul-86 6.375 −0.5 36 Friday
14-Aug-86 6.3125 −0.0625 34 Thursday
21-Aug-86 5.875 −0.4375 7 Thursday
4-Dec-86 6 0.125 105 Thursday
30-Apr-87 6.5 0.5 147 Thursday
21-May-87 6.75 0.25 147 Thursday
2-Jul-87 6.625 −0.125 21 Thursday
27-Aug-87 6.75 0.125 56 Thursday
3-Sep-87 6.875 0.125 7 Thursday
4-Sep-87 7.25 0.375 1 Friday
24-Sep-87 7.3125 0.0625 20 Thursday
21-Oct-87 7.1.25 −0.1875 28 Thursday
28-Oct-87 7 −0.125 6 Wednesday
4-Nov-87 6.8125 −0.1875 7 Wednesday
28-Jan-88 6.625 −0.1875 85 Thursday
11-Feb-88 6.5 −0.125 14 Thursday
30-Mar-88 6.75 0.25 48 Wednesday
9-May-88 7 0.25 40 Monday
25-May-88 7.25 0.25 16 Wednesday
22-Jun-88 7.5 0.25 28 Wednesday
19-Jul-88 7.6875 0.1875 27 Tuesday
8-Aug-88 7.75 0.0625 20 Monday
9-Aug-88 8.125 0.375 1 Tuesday
20-Oct-88 8.25 0.125 72 Thursday
17-Nov-88 8.3125 0.0625 28 Thursday
22-Nov-88 8.375 0.0625 5 Thursday
15-Dec-88 8.6875 0.3125 23 Thursday
29-Dec-88 8.75 0.0625 14 Thursday
5-Jan-89 9 0.25 7 Thursday
9-Feb-89 9.0625 0.0625 35 Thursday
14-Feb-89 9.3125 0.25 5 Tuesday
23-Feb-89 9.5625 0.25 9 Thursday
24-Feb-89 9.75 0.1875 1 Friday
4-May-89 9.8125 0.0625 69 Thursday
6-Jun-89 9.5625 −0.25 33 Tuesday
(continued)
Date of change Target value Target change Duration in days Day of the week
7-Ju-89 9.3125 −0.25 31 Friday
27-Jul-89 9.0625 −0.25 20 Thursday
10-Aug-89 9 −0.0625 14 Thursday
18-Oct-89 8.75 −0.25 69 Wednesday
22-May-86 6.8125 0.0625 28 Thursday
5-Jun-86 6.875 0.0625 14 Thursday
13-Jul-90 8 −0.25 205 Friday
29-Oct-90 7.75 −0.25 108 Monday
14-Nov-90 7.5 −0.25 16 Wednesday
7-Dec-90 7.25 −0.25 23 Friday
19-Dec-90 7 −0.25 12 Wednesday
9-Jan-91 6.75 −0.25 21 Wednesday
1-Feb-91 6.25 −0.25 23 Friday
8-Mar-91 6 −0.25 35 Friday
30-Apr-91 5.75 −0.25 53 Tuesday
6-Aug-91 5.5 −0.25 98 Tuesday
13-Sep-91 5.25 −0.25 38 Friday
31-Oct-91 5 −0.25 48 Thursday
6-Nov-91 4.75 −0.25 6 Wednesday
6-Dec-91 4.5 −0.25 30 Friday
20-Dec-91 4 −0.5 14 Friday
9-Apr-92 3.75 −0.25 111 Thursday
2-Jul-92 3.25 −0.5 84 Thursday
4-Sep-92 3 −0.25 64 Friday
4-Feb-94 3.25 0.25 518 Friday
22-Mar-94 3.5 0.25 46 Tuesday
18-Apr-94 3.75 0.25 27 Monday
17-May-94 4.25 0.5 29 Tuesday
16-Aug-94 4.75 0.5 91 Tuesday
15-Nov-94 5.5 0.75 91 Tuesday
1-Feb-95 6 0.5 78 Wednesday
6-Jul-95 5.75 −0.25 155 Thursday
19-Dec-95 5.5 −0.25 166 Tuesday
31-Jan-96 5.25 −0.25 43 Wednesday
25-Mar-97 5.5 −0.25 419 Tuesday
29-Sep-98 5.25 −0.25 553 Tuesday
15-Oct-98 5 −0.25 16 Thursday
17-Nov-98 4.75 −0.25 33 Tuesday
30-Jun-99 5 0.25 225 Tuesday
24-Aug-99 5.25 0.25 55 Tuesday
16-Nov-99 5.5 0.25 84 Tuesday
2-Feb-00 5.75 0.25 78 Wednesday
21-Mar-00 6 0.25 48 Tuesday
16-May-00 6.5 0.5 56 Tuesday
3-Jan-01 6 −0.5 232 Wednesday
6-Nov-89 8.5 −0.25 19 Monday
20-Dec-89 8.25 −0.25 44 Wednesday
31-Jan-01 5.5 −0.25 28 Wednesday
20-Mar-01 5 −0.5 48 Tuesday
18-Apr-01 4.5 −0.5 29 Wednesday
15-May-01 5 −0.5 27 Tuesday
27-Jun-01 3.75 −0.25 43 Wednesday
21-Aug-01 3.5 −0.25 55 Tuesday
17-Sep-01 3 −0.5 27 Monday
2-Oct-01 2.5 −0.5 15 Tuesday
6-Nov-01 5 −0.5 35 Tuesday
11-Dec-01 1.75 −0.25 35 Tuesday
6-Nov-02 1.25 −0.25 330 Wednesday
26-Jun-03 1 0.25 232 Thursday
30-Jun-04 1.25 0.25 370 Wednesday
10-Aug-04 1.5 0.25 41 Tuesday
21-Sep-04 1.75 0.25 42 Tuesday
10-Nov-04 2 0.25 50 Wednesday
14-Dec-04 2.25 0.25 34 Thursday
2-Feb-05 2.5 0.25 50 Wednesday
22-Mar-05 2.75 0.25 48 Thursday
3-May-05 3 0.25 42 Tuesday
30-Jun-05 1.25 0.25 58 Tuesday
9-Aug-05 3.5 0.25 40 Tuesday
20-Sep-05 3.75 0.25 42 Tuesday
1-Nov-05 4 0.25 42 Tuesday
13-Dec-05 4.25 0.25 42 Tuesday
31-Jan-06 4.5 0.25 49 Tuesday
28-Mar-06 4.75 0.25 56 Tuesday
10-May-06 5 0.25 43 Wednesday
29-Jun-06 5.25 0.25 50 Thursday
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Appendix C. Dates of FOMC federal funds target
changes—1984–2008
Year FOMC dates
1984 January 30–31
March 26–27
May 21–22
July 16–17
August 21
October 2nd
November 7th
December 17–18
1985 February 12–13
March 26th
May 21st
July 9–10
August 20th
October 1st
November 4–5
December 16–17
1986 February 11–12
April 1st
May 20th
July 8–9
August 19th
September 23rd
November 5th
December 15–16
1987 February 10–11
March 31st
May 19th
July 7th
August 18th
September 22nd
November 3rd
December 15–16
1988 February 9–10
March 29th
May 17th
June 29–30
August 16th
September 30th
November 1st
December 13–14
1989 February 6–7
March 28th
May 16th
July 5–6
August 22nd
October 3rd
November 14th
December 18–19
1990 February 6–7
March 27th
May 15th
July 2–3
(continued)
Date of change Target value Target change Duration in days Day of the week
18-Sep-07 4.75 −0.5 446 Tuesday
31-Oct-07 4.5 −0.25 43 Wednesday
11-Dec-07 4.25 −0.25 41 Tuesday
22-Jan-08 3.5 −0.75 42 Tuesday
30-Jan-08 3 −0.5 8 Wednesday
18-May-08 2.25 −0.75 48 Tuesday
30-Apr-08 2 −0.25 43 Wednesday
8-Oct-08 1.5 −0.5 160 Friday
29-Oct-08 1 −0.5 21 Friday
Append x B (continued) (continued)
Year FOMC dates
August 21st
October 2nd
November 13th
December 17–18
1991 February 5–6
March 26th
May 14th
July 2–3
August 20th
October 1st
November 5th
December 17–18
1992 February 4–5
March 31st
May 19th
June 30–31
August 18th
October 16th
November 17th
December 22nd
1993 February 2–3
March 23rd
May 18th
July 6–7
August 17th
September 21st
November 16th
December 21st
1994 February 3–4
March 22nd
May 17th
July 5–6
August 16th
September 27th
November 15th
December 20th
1995 January 31–1
March 28th
May 23rd
July 5–6
August 22nd
September 26th
November 15th
December 19th
1996 January 30–31
March 26th
May 21st
July 2–3
August 20th
September 24th
November 13th
December 17th
1997 February 4–5
March 25th
May 20th
July 1–2
August 19th
September 30th
November 12th
December 16th
1998 February 3–4
March 31st
May 19th
June/July 301
August 18th
September 29th
November 17th
December 22nd
1999 February 3–4
March 30th
May 18th
June 29–30
August 24th
October 5th
November 16th
December 21th
2000 February 1–2
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Appendix D. Data variables for sample period March 2003 to
September 2008
Appendix E
We calculate the impulse response function for credit premia
growth responding to changes in the first term on the right-hand
side of Eq. (15) as follows. Given the historical values for (Y1,τ,Yτ−1,
Yτ−2,…), we use the ACH model to calculate the impact if the Fed
raises the target by, say, 25 basis points during month τ (so thatiτ=
iτ−1+0.25) compared to keeping the target constant (iτ=iτ−1). For
this calculation, we assume that the second term on the right-hand
side of Eq. (15) is zero, so that expectations are for no change in the
federal funds rate target. The difference is normalized in units of a
derivative, as follows:
0:25ð Þ−1 ~yrþjjr irð Þjir ¼ ir−1 þ 0:25−~yrþjjr irð Þjir ¼ ir−1
h i
E:1
where Y τþjjτ iτð Þ summarizes the dynamic consequences of the fore-
cast time path for {iτ+j}j=0,∞ as calculated by the ACH model.
We also investigate the consequences of changes in the second
term in Eq. (15), the impact if investors predict a change in the target
but none occurs. Let
⌢
iτjτ−1 denote the forecast for the target in month
τ based on historical information available in month τ−1. Then we
calculate the consequences as follows:
ωr ~yrþjjr irð Þjir ¼ ir−1− ~yrþjjr irð Þjir ¼ irjr−1
h i
E:2
where
ωr ¼ ir−1−i^ rjr−1
 −1
if ir−1−i^rjr−1
  > 0:05
0 otherwise
:
(
The effect of the weightwt in Eq. (E.2) is to ignore observations for
which no change was expected and to rescale positive or negative
forecast errors into units comparable to Eq. (E.1).
References
Almeida, H., & Campello, M. (2007). Financial constraints, asset tangibility and corpo-
rate investment. Review of Financial Studies, 20(5), 1429–1460.
Andersen, T. G., Bollersev, T., Diebold, F. X., & Vega, C. (2007). Real-time price discovery
in stock, bond and foreign exchange markets. Journal of International Economics, 73,
251–277.
Ashcraft, A. B., & Santos, A. C. (2007). Has the credit default swap market lowered the
cost of corporate debt? Staff Report, 290, : Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Bernanke, B. S., & Blinder, A. (1992). The federal funds rate and the channels of mone-
tary transmission. American Economic Review, 82(4), 901–921.
Variables Data source
Federal funds target (f) magnitude and
date of change.
Federal Reserve Bank New York
Federal Open Market Committee (FQMC)
meeting dates.
Federal Reserve Bank New York
Spread between effective federal funds rate
and six meeting dates.
Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis
Growth of employment (EM). Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis
Inflation rate (P). Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis
Market liquidity (LIQ-difference between
3-month T bill and 3-month Eurodollar rate).
Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis.
Log of broad money (M2). Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis
Log of investment grade credit risk (CDXI)—125
investment grade companies.
Markit Financial Services
Log of high yield credit risk (CDXh)—100
high yield grade companies.
Markit Financial Services
(continued)
Year FOMC dates
March 21st
May 16th
June 27–28
August 22nd
October 3rd
November 15th
December 19th
2001 January 30–31
March 20th
May 15th
June 26–27
August 21st
October 2nd
November 6th
December 11th
2002 January 29–30
March 19th
May 7th
June 25–26
August 13th
September 24th
November 6th
December 10th
2003 January 28–29
March 18th
May 6th
June 24–25
August 12th
September 16th
October 28th
December 9th
2004 January 27–28
March 16th
May 4th
June 29–30
August 10th
September 21st
November 10th
December 14th
2005 February 1–2
March 22nd
May 3rd
June 29–30
August 9th
September 20th
November 1st
December 13th
2006 January 31st
March 27–28
June 28–29
August 8th
September 20th
October 24–25
December 12th
2007 January 30–31
March 20–21
May 9th
June 27–28
August 7, 10, 16
September 18th
October 30–31
December 6, 11
2008 January 9, 21, 29–30
March 10, 18
April 29–30
June 24–25
July 24th
August 5th
Appendix C (continued)
151K. Dunbar, A.S. Amin / Review of Financial Economics 21 (2012) 141–152
Author's personal copy
Bernanke, B. S., & Kuttner, K. N. (2005). What explains the stock market's reaction to
federal reserve policy? Journal of Finance, 6(3), 1221–1257.
Campbell, J. Y. (1991). A variance decomposition for stock returns. The Economic Journal,
101, 157–179.
Campbell, J. Y., & Ammer, J. (1993).Whatmoves the stock and bondmarkets: A variance
decomposition for long-term asset returns. Journal of Finance, 48, 3–37.
Cassola, N., & Morana, C. (2004). Monetary policy and the stock market in the Euro
area. Journal of Policy Modeling, 26(3), 387–399.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., & Evans, C. (1996). The effects of monetary policy
shocks: Evidence from the flow of funds. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
78(1), 16–34.
Chulia, H., Martens, M., & Dijk, D. V. (2010). Asymmetric effects of federal funds target
rate changes on S&P 100 stock returns, volatilities and correlations. Journal of Banking
and Finance, 34, 834–839.
Cook, T., & Hahn, T. (1989). Federal Reserve information and the behavior of interest
rates. Journal of Monetary Economics, 24, 331–351.
Croushore, D., & Evans, C. L. (2006). Data revisions and the identification of monetary
policy shocks. Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, 1135–1160.
Das, S. R. (1995). Credit risk derivatives. Journal of Derivatives, 2, 7–23.
Duffie, D., & Singleton, K. J. (1999). Modeling term structures of defaultable bonds.
Review of Financial Studies, 12, 687–720.
Dunbar, K. (2008). US corporate default swap valuation: the market liquidity hypothesis
and autonomous credit risk. Quantitative Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, 8(3),
321–334.
Engle, R. F., & Russell, J. R. (1998). Autoregressive conditional duration: A new model
for irregularly spaced transaction data. Econometrica, 66, 1127–1162.
Ewing, B. T., Forbes, S. M., & Payne, J. E. (2003). The effects of macroeconomic shocks on
sector-specific returns. Applied Economics, 35, 201–207.
Guo, H. (2004). Stock prices, firm size, and changes in the federal funds rate target. The
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 44, 487–550.
Gurkaynak, R. S., Sack, B. P., & Swanson, E. T. (2005). Do actions speak louder than
words? The response of asset prices to monetary policy actions and statements.
International Journal of Central Banking, 1, 55–93.
Hahn, J., & Lee, H. (2009). Financial constraints, debt capacity, and the cross-section of
stock returns. Journal of Finance, 891–921.
Hamilton, J. D., & Jorda, O. (2002). A model of the federal funds rate target. Journal of
Political Economy, 110, 1135–1166.
Houweling, P., & Vorst, T. (2005). Pricing default swaps: Empirical evidence. Journal of
International Money and Finance, 24(8), 1200–1225.
Hull, J., & White, A. (2000). Valuing credit default swaps I: No counterparty default risk.
Journal of Derivatives, 8, 29–40.
Jaffee, D. M., & Russell, T. (1976). Imperfect information, uncertainty, and credit ration-
ing. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 841–891.
Jarrow, R. A., Lando, D., & Turnbull, S. M. (1997). A Markov model for the term structure
of credit risk spreads. The Review of Financial Studies, 10(2), 481–523.
Jarrow, R. A., & Turnbull, S. M. (1995). Pricing derivatives on financial securities subject
to credit risk. Journal of Finance, 50, 53–85.
Kuttner, K. N. (2001). Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence from the
fed funds futures market. Journal of Monetary Economics, 47, 523–544.
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest
rates. Journal of Finance, 29, 449–470.
Pierides, Y. A. (1997). The pricing of credit risk derivatives. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 21, 1579–1611.
Silipo, D. B. (2011). It happened again: A Minskian analysis of the subprime loan crisis.
Journal of Economics and Business, 63, 441–455.
Stigitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing and markets with imperfect information.
American Economic Review, 71, 393–411.
Thorbecke, W. (1997). On stock market returns andmonetary policy. Journal of Finance,
52, 635–654.
Tsai, C. (2011). The reaction of stock returns to unexpected increases in the federal
funds rate target. Journal of Economics and Business, 63(2), 121–138.
Wongswan, J. (2009). The response of global equity indexes to US monetary policy
announcements. Journal of International Money and Finance, 28, 344–365.
152 K. Dunbar, A.S. Amin / Review of Financial Economics 21 (2012) 141–152
